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Abstract 
In recent decades the use of referendums to settle major constitutional questions has 
increased dramatically. Addressing this phenomenon as a case study in the 
relationship between democracy and constitutional sovereignty, this article has two 
aims. The first is to argue that these constitutional referendums are categorically 
different from ordinary, legislative referendums, and that this has important 
implications for theories of constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, the article suggests 
that the power of these constitutional referendums to re-order sovereign relations 
raises significant normative questions surrounding the appropriateness of their use. 
The article engages with these normative questions, enquiring whether the recent turn 
in republican political theory towards deliberative democracy may offer a model 
through which sufficiently democratic referendum processes can be constructed. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of referendums around the world has grown remarkably in the past thirty 
years
1
 and in some places, such as California and Switzerland, they act almost as 
adjuncts to the legislature. A particularly notable development in recent decades, 
however, is that referendums have been used not simply in the ordinary legislative 
process, but increasingly in the settlement of fundamental constitutional questions, 
and often in countries with no tradition of direct democracy.
2
 There are four ways in 
which referendums are used today at the constitutional level: to found new states;
3
 to 
create or radically change constitutions;
4
 to establish complex new models of sub-
state autonomy;
5
 and to transfer sovereign powers from the state to international 
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1
 Lawrence LeDuc estimates that of the 58 functioning electoral democracies in the world with a 
population of more than three million, 39 had conducted at least one national referendum between 1975 
and 2000. L. Leduc, The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective (New 
York: Broadview Press, 2003), 29.  
2
 In 2005 the Netherlands conducted its first ever referendum on the draft European Union 
Constitutional Treaty. 
3
 East Timor, 1999 and Montenegro, 2006. 
4
 Fairly recent, albeit unsuccessful, attempts include the referendum over the draft Charlottetown 
agreement in Canada in 1992 and that concerning the head of state in Australia in 1999. 
5
 The UK is an interesting case with referendums following the Belfast Agreement 1998 and others on 
Scottish and Welsh devolution in 1979 and 1997. Spain has also seen referendums on sub-state 
autonomy since 1978 and more are planned by the Basque Country and Catalonia by 2014. 
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institutions.
6
 What connects these four types of referendum is that they each address 
the location or distribution of ultimate lawful authority within the polity, and in doing 
so implicate the sovereign relations between people and government.
7
 It seems, 
therefore, that referendums offer a novel perspective on how these relationships are 
encapsulated in constitutional moments across a range of settings. Constitutional 
moments differ from ordinary politics both in terms of their significance
8
 but also in 
the way they change how ordinary politics is thereafter conducted.
9
 It will be argued 
in this article that, in similar ways, constitutional referendums can be said to differ 
from ordinary or legislative referendums. 
The starting point for this argument is to explore what is particularly 
significant about constitutional referendums in the context of sovereignty theory. 
Despite their growing prominence in processes of constitutional creation and change, 
it is surprising that constitutional referendums have rarely been subjected to 
systematic classification or critical analysis by constitutional theorists.
10
 Insofar as 
referendums have been studied, the focus has usually come from empirical political 
scientists who are generally concerned more with the detail of the electoral process 
than with the constitutional implications of referendums.
11
 More noteworthy is a 
general failure on the part of constitutional lawyers and theorists to address 
referendums at all, far less to distinguish the particular legal implications of 
‘constitutional referendums’ from those of ‘ordinary referendums’.
12
 Therefore, we 
will seek to develop this field of enquiry by asking what implications constitutional 
referendums have for the relational dimension – people to government – of 
constitutional sovereignty today. The principal argument is that constitutional 
referendums can serve to unsettle the traditional balance between constituent power 
and constitutional form in the contemporary polity, substituting the people directly for 
the representational role traditionally played by the democratic constitution. This 
supplanting of representative constitutionalism is a very different function from that 
performed by ordinary referendums which, in merely replacing the legislature in 
ordinary law-making, carry no real implications for constitutional supremacy.  
                                                 
6
 France as well as the Netherlands famously held a referendum on the draft Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 and in 2008 the Irish referendum on the draft Reform Treaty caused controversy. 
7
 Following Loughlin, who has defined sovereignty as ‘an expression of a political relationship 
between the people and the state’. M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 95.  
8
 B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
9
 B. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
10
 Notable contributions include: I. Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996) and M. Setälä, Referendums and Democratic Government (New York: St Martin’s  
1999). 
11
 D. Butler and A. Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct 
Democracy (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994); M. Gallagher & P. Uleri (eds), The Referendum 
Experience in Europe (London: Palgrave/MacMillan, 1996); M. Mendelsohn and A. Parkin, 
Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites, and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001); M. Qvortrup, A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
12
 Certain political scientists are at least alive to the category of constitutional referendums. LeDuc, n 1 
above, introduces the species although understandably, given his focus, he makes little of it in 
fundamental distinction with ordinary referendums. See also A. Auer and M. Bützer (eds), Direct 
Democracy: the Eastern and Central European Experience (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), introductory 
chapter. Recently there has been a recognition of the importance of constitutional referendums at the 
EU level: (M. Shu, ‘Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU’ (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 423), but broader theoretical work remains lacking. 
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This exposition of the specific legal consequences of constitutional 
referendums for sovereignty theory has important normative ramifications which we 
turn to in Section II. Existing analysis of referendums by constitutional theorists tends 
to focus on whether or not, in democratic terms, they are an appropriate mechanism of 
law-making.
13
 This is a debate that also generally fails to distinguish between the 
respective appropriateness of constitutional and ordinary referendums, with a 
seemingly implicit assumption that each raise the same normative issues. A second 
claim, therefore, is that the distinctive positive legal issues we identify have knock-on 
implications for the democratic debate. As we will see, it is both the importance of the 
issues at stake in constitutional referendums and the ways in which they involve the 
very identity of a constitutional people that together bring up these discrete and 
important normative concerns. Since the democracy issues addressed in Section II 
flow directly from the sovereignty questions raised in Section I, this takes us to the 
heart of contemporary debates between republican theorists who view a coherent and 
politically active demos as a fundamental prerequisite of a healthy democracy, and 
pluralists and ‘difference democrats’ who to varying extents worry that the 
referendum can be a dangerously homogenising device that ill-serves the subtle 
matrix of identity patterns that characterise the modern polity. The final section of the 
article asks whether deliberative democracy can offer a way of constructing 
referendum processes that might make them an acceptable model of decision-making, 
even for a culturally and politically diverse society. 
 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: RE-AWAKENING POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY 
In addressing the implications which constitutional referendums present for how we 
theorise sovereignty, it is helpful to situate the distinction between constitutional 
referendums and ordinary or legislative referendums in the context of the two orders 
of legal rules that together comprise a constitutional system and the respective levels 
of representation that typically attend the formation of each of these orders of rule. 
The concept of two orders of legal rules is well-established. Kelsen used the term 
grundnorm to describe the basic, and hence ultimate, rule within a legal system. Hart 
of course deviated in important ways from Kelsen’s holistic model of positivism, but 
nonetheless his notion of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules shares at least one 
commitment with Kelsen, that ordinary laws and higher laws can be distinguished by 
the capacity of the latter to offer a legally legitimate process for the creation and 
amendment of the former. This is a defining characteristic of the grundnorm, but it is 
also captured in Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’ which establishes a set of criteria by 
which we can identify the validity or otherwise of both constitutional and lower order 
rule-making.
14
  
These categories develop the notion of legal supremacy but it is also important 
to note that this supremacy rests upon political foundations. Here the distinction 
offered by Kalyvas between ‘command sovereignty’ and ‘constituent sovereignty’ is 
                                                 
13
 S. Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 
Constellations 153; A. Eisenberg ‘When (if Ever) Are Referendums on Minority Rights Fair?’, in D. 
Laycock (ed), Representation and Democratic Theory (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2004); J. Haskell, Direct Democracy or Representative Government? Dispelling the Populist 
Myth (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). 
14
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 89-96.  
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useful.
15
 The former is the classical model of the final word, central to modernist 
accounts of the legal system as Rechtsstaat. Within the Westphalian tradition of state-
building, as conceptualised by Kelsen and Hart, it is considered that any legal order 
must have an absolute and final arbiter, and hence the sovereign is characterised, for 
example by de Spinoza, as he who ‘has the sovereign right of imposing any 
commands he pleases’.
16
 Constituent sovereignty, however, is for Kalyvas a neglected 
model which is concerned not with ‘coercive power’ but rather ‘constituting power’: 
‘Thus, contrary to the paradigm of the sovereign command that invites personification 
and can better be exercised by an individual who represents and embodies the unity of 
authority – from the ancient imperatore to the king to the modern executive – the 
constituent power points at the collective, intersubjective, and impersonal attributes of 
sovereignty, at its cooperative, public dimension.’
17
 This involves seeing the 
sovereign as ‘constituent subject’, as the one who shapes not only the governmental 
structure of a community but also its juridical and political identity;
18
 in other words, 
as the source of the constitution and of its authority.  
In addressing referendums we are interested in sovereignty in this sense, as 
creative force rather than merely as legal restraint. Moving on from the narrow 
legalism that has encapsulated so much work on sovereignty we are asking: in a 
constitutional referendum, can ‘the people’ be envisaged as intervening directly to 
‘produce’ sovereign decisions in a way which affirms that legitimate democratic 
authority emanates from popular consent rather than the institutions of state? In other 
words, do these referendums encapsulate a real world manifestation of the notion of 
the people as ultimate source of legitimate power? Therefore, our enquiry concerns 
how constitutional referendums are used to produce higher order law, which in turn 
makes them a very different animal from referendums engaged in ordinary law-
making. Constitutional referendums implicate what is perhaps the central relationship 
within constitutional democracy - that between constituent power and constitutional 
form. It is often argued (or rather assumed) in much of the existing literature on 
referendums that this is the case also with referendums engaged in first order law-
making; ‘referendum democracy’
19
 is frequently cited as the mobilisation of ‘popular 
sovereignty’, regardless of the issue at stake. But such a generalisation is in fact a 
category mistake, and one of some significance.  
There is certainly a sense in which, whenever the people are directly engaged 
in any law-making process, their exercise of collective will-formation and expression 
acts as a symbolic reminder that democratic authority finds its legitimacy in the 
consent of the people. But at the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that 
‘sovereignty’ refers to the ultimate source of legal power within a legal system, 
identifying second order competence to determine authoritatively the status of first 
order rules; and, therefore, any reference to popular ‘sovereignty’, to remain a 
coherent concept for legal theory, particularly within the elaborate constitutional 
frameworks that exist today, must be concerned precisely with those situations where 
‘the people’ can be shown to exercise direct control over second-order law-making – 
in other words, acting to ‘produce’ sovereignty in Kalyvas’ sense. Just as we must not 
                                                 
15
 A. Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and Constituent Power’ (2005) 12 Constellations 223, 
224. 
16
 B. de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise, tr. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951) 207, 
cited by Kalyvas, n 15 above.  
17
 Kalyvas, n 15 above, 235-236. 
18
 Kalyvas, n 15 above, 226.  
19
 Mendelsohn and Parkin, n 11 above. 
 5
elide first and second order rules, nor should we confuse the modes of their respective 
creation, or the role citizens play in these different law-making processes. Legislative 
referendums do not impact upon the location and distribution of sovereign power 
within the state; rather they are constrained to play a role within mainstream 
representative democracy, subordinate to the second order rules that provide these 
referendums with their normative competence. Therefore, even the categorisation of 
legislative referendums as an instance of direct as opposed to representative 
democracy is perhaps something of an over-simplification. In playing a role within a 
broader representative system of government, where the authority of these 
referendums is clearly subsidiary to those constitutional institutions which retain the 
competence to create and change higher order rules, they should perhaps more 
accurately be portrayed as being part of that representative system, since the effect 
given to the outcomes they produce is ultimately subject to the representative 
competence of constitutional institutions, most obviously legislatures, but also courts. 
In contrast, the people’s direct democratic capacity to act as, or at least to influence 
the location and distribution of, the supreme source of constitutional law within a 
polity, distinguishes constitutional referendums as, potentially at least, true conduits 
of popular determination. Of the four types of constitutional referendums set out in 
the introduction, those which found new states or create constitutions are the most 
obvious manifestations of popular sovereignty, but those which establish complex 
new models of sub-state autonomy or transfer sovereign powers from the state to 
international institutions, can also be viewed as acts of constitution-making. 
But we must still ask, why does this matter?  What is it about the use of 
constitutional referendums in sovereign decision-making that causes us to reflect on 
the nature of legal sovereignty itself? It seems that, in legal terms, constitutional 
referendums raise important and discrete challenges to how we understand the nature 
of supremacy within a representative system of government in a way which legislative 
referendums simply do not.
20
 The very notion of a ‘representative democracy’ 
recognises that while the authority of a legal order might be conceptualised as 
deriving originally from direct popular authority (whether real or imagined), the act of 
constitution-making replaces this authority with two levels of representation. At the 
first (lower) level, the role of representative of the people is assumed by legislators, 
and at the second (higher) level by the normative supremacy of the constitution itself. 
Each to a different extent supplants the people’s original direct decision-making 
competence. Before turning to the specific implications of constitutional referendums 
for these two levels of representation, it is necessary to explore this notion of 
representation further. 
The American revolutionary experience provides a classic example of how the 
democratic constitution of the modern era assumed this second-order representational 
function. Following the success of the 1776 constitutional revolt and, subsequently, 
the inchoate nature of legal authority in the unsettled Confederation period, the 
authority of the revolutionary people was transformed, or, to use a term that perhaps 
more accurately catches the temporal as well as the legal significance of the moment, 
crystallised, in the constitutional moment of 1787 into that of a constitutional 
                                                 
20
 We should be careful to note that not all ‘constitutional’ referendums supplant constitutional 
institutions in their entirety; the line from constitutional to legislative referendums can be a blurred one. 
The claim here is merely that they can do so, and even when they operate within existing constitutional 
frameworks, they still involve the people directly in fundamental issues of constitutional design.  
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people.
21
 The pre-constitutional revolutionary subject was no more, being at once 
both conceptually re-created and frozen in time by the constitutional settlement. In 
other words, although the constitution can be seen as the progeny of the revolutionary 
demos in terms of the popular legitimacy that this constitution claimed for its new 
legal supremacy, it in fact also served to re-shape the identity of its creator in its very 
own likeness: a legally-defined (and controlled) constitutional demos superseding the 
radical, revolutionary people of the pre-constitutional polity.
22
  
Despite its conservative outcome, the process culminating in 1787 was 
genuinely revolutionary. In the transition to the new constitution, the people(s) of the 
thirteen states were envisaged as sovereign – albeit that this sovereignty was 
represented indirectly through each state’s delegates at Philadelphia – in the sense of 
being unconstrained by the existing constitutional arrangements of the Articles of 
Confederation.
23
 But in this act of constitutional creation this sovereignty was 
transformed from the direct to the representative - the real to the symbolic - through 
subsumption of that sovereignty by the constitution itself. Passing into the new 
constitutional order, the ‘sovereign people’ remained in theoretical terms as a 
legitimising concept, but the reality of sovereign power and the pathways of its 
permissible exercise, were now in the keeping of the people only as represented, 
constitutional subject.
24
 In the European idea of the Rechtsstaat we see a similar 
process at work whereby constituent power is replaced by the representational force 
of constitutional authority. The result is that in most democratic constitutions today 
the principle of popular sovereignty, where it survives at all, does so as a 
constitutional ephemera, ‘no more than a verbal homage to the democratic-
representative character of contemporary political systems.’
25
 
This process is captured in juridical terms by the concept of representation. At 
the first order level of ordinary legislation, politicians and political institutions 
represent the people functionally in terms of will-formation and expression. And at 
the constitutional level we find something similar: the institutions of the constitution 
                                                 
21
 Of course, whether the USA represented only one sovereign people or a collection of sovereign 
states remained an open issue until settled in favour of the former conceptualisation by the Civil War 
and its subsequent legal consolidation: e.g. Texas v White 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
22
 Gallagher introduces a distinction between ‘the conceptual people from whom the constitutional 
order derives and … the empirically given people who actually live under the constitution.’ M. 
Gallagher, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Referendums’, in Auer and Bützer, n 12 above, 228, 228. 
23
 The Philadelphia Convention was established by the Articles of Confederation, but in the end it 
displaced these powers and claimed that the legitimate source of the new constitution was ‘the 
transcendent and precious right of the people to “abolish or alter their government as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness”.’ James Madison, ‘The Federalist No. 40’, citing 
a similar sentiment expressed in the Declaration of Independence. For all references to the Federalist 
Papers see I. Kramnick (ed), The Federalist Papers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987). Jon Elster 
described this as ‘constitutional bootstrapping’: ‘the process by which a constituent assembly severs its 
ties with the authorities that have called it into being and arrogates some or all of their powers to itself.’ 
J. Elster, ‘Constitutional bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia’, (1992-93) 14 Cardozo Law Journal 
549, 549.  
24
 It is not the case that constitutional form simply replaced constituent power in this process. In fact, 
constitutional form itself transplants the idea of the people as source of constituent power, and instead 
we find a merging of the two concepts; the new constitutional order is supreme but this new order 
embodies the people as constitutional subject. As Elster puts it, ‘the ultimate act of the American 
assembly of Philadelphia was to break with the past in order to redefine American national identity.’ 
Elster, n 23 above, 550 (emphasis added); in other words, a national identity emerged that mapped 
perfectly onto a constitutional identity. 
25
 L. Ferrajoli, ‘Beyond sovereignty and citizenship: a global constitutionalism’, in R. Bellamy (ed), 
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty (England: Avebury, 1996) 152. 
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come to represent the people in acts of will-formation and expression when the 
constitution is amended by institutions in place of and in the name of the people. But, 
in addition, the constitution as a concept takes on a second, symbolic representational 
role, encapsulating the very identity of the people itself. Rather than being merely 
functional, as it is at the legislative level, this form of representation is an emblematic 
feature of the constitution’s very meaning – as embodiment of the settled will of a 
democratic people. And individuals come to identify with one another, therefore, 
through their shared commitment to this constitution which itself becomes a central 
component of their collective identity. It is in the context of this nation-building 
potential of constitutional law-making that we must address constitutional 
referendums. When referendums are used to make or re-create constitutions they too 
can take on a vital nation-building role. Constitutional referendums are not, like 
ordinary legislative referendums, merely a decision-making mechanism; instead they 
become part of the identificatory symbolism of the constitution and of the state. In 
other words, constitutional referendums can intervene in the most fundamental acts of 
constitutional self-definition. This has important implications for sovereignty theory, 
since in these acts the people can come to supplant the representative institutions that 
(in the name of the people) have become the accepted receptacle of legal supremacy 
in contemporary democracies. And it is this radical legal potential of these 
referendums, with the power they carry to override both levels of constitutional 
representation, that brings with it important normative consequences for how we 
understand constitutional democracy today.  
We will turn now to arguments for and against the use of referendums, 
exploring how these need to be addressed afresh in the context of constitutional 
referendums. The role of these referendums in deciding the most fundamental issues 
of constitutional law and in influencing the very constitutional identity of the polity 
confronts us with novel and unsettling normative challenges for the democratic polity. 
 
II. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFERENDUMS 
1. Framing the challenge 
In taking the representational distinction between the functional and the symbolic 
further in order to assess normative arguments for the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of constitutional referendums, we will take republican theory as a 
benchmark. This branch of democratic theory, which has enjoyed a recent 
renaissance,
26
 is a broad church, but its advocates share a commitment to a politically-
engaged demos in partial realisation of the ideal of ‘government by the people’. We 
will explore both how this commitment to participatory democracy can be squared 
with an entrenched (representative) constitution, and how the constitutional 
referendum can be contextualised within this republican revival.  
We have observed that one way to understand the role of referendums is to 
envisage them as a means by which representation is itself supplanted, returning 
direct power to the people; in other words as some kind of reversal of the original act 
of transference, or at least as a temporary return of power to the people. In such a 
conceptualisation it is important to maintain the distinction between those 
                                                 
26
 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: OUP, 1999); J. Maynor, 
Republicanism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); D. Weinstock and C. Nadeau (eds), 
Republicanism: History, Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2004);  R. Bellamy, Political 
Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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referendums which displace only first order (legislative/functional) representation and 
those that interpose direct popular decision-making at the second order 
(constitutional/symbolic) level, since what is being reclaimed in the name of the 
people directly in the latter situation is not just the capacity for direct will-formation 
and expression, but also competence to control the definition of a people’s self-
identity and that identity’s constitutional manifestation.  
The distinction between the two levels of representation therefore has 
implications for the legitimacy of referendums. Those who argue that there is no place 
for referendums in a democracy typically contend that politicians are better able to 
make decisions on behalf of the people. There are various justifications for this 
argument, but usually it rests on the expertise of politicians and the time and interest 
they can bring to politics, in contrast to ordinary citizens.
27
 This ‘expertise argument’ 
is typically more one of pragmatics than principle. It might be conceded that popular 
decision-making is the ideal model of democracy but, the argument goes, in practice 
this is unrealistic because of a lack of knowledge of complex issues on the part of 
ordinary people and the motivational, organisational and related difficulties in 
educating people about these matters. Indeed, referendums are not just impractical, 
they can be dangerous, because people will often make ill-informed choices without 
proper deliberation. Therefore, a referendum can in reality be no more than an 
exercise in aggregating pre-formed wills without any prospect that people will engage 
in democratic decision-making in a reflective, responsive and deliberative way with a 
preparedness to change their minds.
28
 These arguments feed into a more general 
concern that referendums held in such circumstances are open to elite manipulation, 
to the point where they cannot be seen in any meaningful sense as acts of direct self-
determination.
29
  
Even if we accept these arguments at the legislative level, however, there are 
reasons to doubt their grip on the constitutional plane. There are two specific features 
of higher order law-making that seem to offer a stronger prima facie argument for 
direct democracy. The first concerns the importance of the issues at stake, which 
prompts the question: are there matters too fundamental to the system of government 
to be left merely to political institutions through constitutional entrenchment? In 
response, as we shall discuss, it might be argued that it is the very importance of these 
issues that demands more than ever the cool judgment of professional representatives. 
The second feature concerns the second level of representation that exists at the 
constitutional level. Does the fact that the definition of the very identity of the demos 
is at issue call for direct popular deliberation in a way that ordinary law-making does 
not? These two questions will be considered in turn in the next two sub-sections. 
 
2. Constitutional entrenchment and the challenge of referendums 
Since the importance of the issue at stake in constitution-making seems to offer 
strength to arguments both for and against direct democracy at the constitutional 
level, we will begin from a negative perspective with the argument that processes of 
constitutional change should be elevated beyond the vagaries of transient majorities – 
popular or otherwise. We will then consider the counter-argument that the 
transformation of an existing constitutional settlement, or the founding of a new 
                                                 
27
 For example, M. Setälä, ‘On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability in Referendums’ 
(2006) 45 European Journal of Political Research 699, 699. See also e.g. G. Sartori, The Theory of 
Democracy Revisited (London: Chatham House, 1987) 120. 
28
 See e.g. Chambers, n 13 above.  
29
 Haskell, n 13 above. 
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constitutional settlement in the name of the people, should involve direct deliberation 
and consent, given the fundamental impact such a process promises for the people’s 
governmental arrangements.  
The argument that referendums are particularly inappropriate for major 
constitutional decisions is similar to that which opposes referendums in general. But 
in these situations it is often made more forcefully. Echoing the claim that ordinary 
people lack specific knowledge of the detail of political issues, the argument proceeds 
that the risk of mistakes is all the more serious when matters of the highest 
constitutional consequence are at stake. Constitutional entrenchment, therefore, is 
purposely crafted to guard against rash judgments being made either by citizens 
directly or by political institutions.
30
 Furthermore, entrenchment is usually given 
effect by a super-majoritarian model, thereby distinguishing the process of 
constitutional law-making from that for ordinary laws which are typically made by a 
simple majority of representatives in a parliament (albeit that such a majority may 
need to be found in two houses rather than one, and may also require executive 
consent). Therefore, we can characterise entrenchment as the combination of two 
constraints: inter-temporal and counter-majoritarian; the former a logical concomitant 
of the latter. A simple majority, however constructed, cannot change the constitution 
and, therefore, the authority of the constitution extends into the future until a super-
majority can be found to change it, thereby bringing later generations under its 
authority in a process justified typically by the Lockean principle of tacit consent.
31
 
But why are constitutions protected in this way, and what are the implications 
for direct democracy? Perhaps the principal reason is, once more, a pragmatic one - 
stability. The danger of constitutional volatility has been apparent to constitutional 
founders at least since Philadelphia.
32
 It may be a psychological reaction to the 
turmoil and violence of revolution that in consequent processes of constitution-
building the aspiration is for a fixed and durable settlement. Furthermore, 
constitutional constancy seems an obvious requirement to protect complex societies 
from the ramifications of dangerous schisms.
33
 It may be unfortunate, given the 
ongoing democratic commitment of a new constitution founded in the name of one 
sovereign people, but it is a social fact that a legal order requires a set of secondary 
norms to provide clarity and strength to primary rules; and, therefore, there is a 
compelling argument that this higher order set of norms should be protected from 
easy amendment by way of ordinary laws. This has combined with a second concern, 
that there are certain values inherent in a constitutional order that should be protected. 
Since the dominant philosophy of contemporary Western constitutionalism is now 
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33
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Penguin, 1963) 163. 
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liberalism, the constitution has often come to be seen as a vehicle for protecting 
individual rights by elevating them beyond the reach of day to day flux.
34
 
But although the concerns for stability and individual interests may be 
important, there still lingers the question: whence comes the authority for such a 
foundational document to bind a republican people into the future? While liberalism 
sees the protection of a priori individual rights as sufficient justification for 
entrenchment, we will concentrate upon another democratic tradition - republicanism 
- since it is here we find a commitment to the politically active and self-determining 
demos as one of the primary values of democracy; and therefore, it is within this 
theory that the challenge to embedded constitutionalism’s constraints becomes most 
acute. The justification for such a level of constitutional protection does of course 
exist within republican thinking and is often based upon a real or imagined moment of 
popular deliberation whereby ‘the people’,
35
 often led by a wise elite (founding 
fathers or the like), in a moment of enlightened epiphany set out a path for the future 
harmony of the polity. In other words, if we look beyond the pragmatic reasons for 
entrenchment advanced by Madison and others, or the liberal argument based upon 
the protection of individual rights, the republican justification, where it exists, is an 
almost metaphysical belief that the founding moment involved some kind of higher 
reasoning worthy of constitutional entrenchment.  
This notion of higher reasoning is problematic in itself as it is seemingly at 
odds with the idea that equality is a pre-existing justification for democracy in the first 
place, but it is also somewhat ironic that there should be such a reification of the 
revolutionary moment when the ideological impetus of revolutionaries often rejects 
such mythical sources of legitimacy, for example, the purportedly enlightened level of 
reasoning/revelation that underpinned theories such as divine right. Indeed, Madison’s 
place in ideological history can be attributed to his very articulation of an overtly 
positivist vision of power based on reason and consent that served to refute the 
mystical pretensions of the ancien regime. In other words, American republicanism 
offered the chance ‘to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative 
body of citizens’ which would dispel forever spurious foundation myths.
36
 In this 
context it seems especially odd that such a process of deliberation at one particular 
moment came to take on, as it has in American constitutional narratives, its own 
mythical aura that serves to elevate its legitimacy above that of subsequent 
deliberative processes. Therefore, one objection to entrenchment is that it can assume 
a deeply conservative bent, arguably aggrandising the value of tradition over that of 
democracy, as caricatured impishly by Chesterton:  
 
Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our ancestors. 
It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to the small and 
arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen to be walking about. All 
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 D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule of Liberal Principle’ in A. Ripstein (ed), Ronald 
Dworkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 56. That the latter justification has largely 
emerged subsequent to the democratic imperative of constitutionalism is, however, evident from the 
fact that the American Bill of Rights was something of an afterthought at Philadelphia, proposed as a 
series of amendments in 1789. 
35
 Using ‘the people’ as a singular noun in English carries its own linguistic constraints, as Canovan 
has shown, but it is this collective, republican construction with which we are dealing. M. Canovan, 
‘Populism for political theorists?’ (2004) 9 Journal of Political Ideologies 241, 250. 
36
 The Federalist Papers, n 23 above, No. 38 (James Madison). 
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democrats object to men being disqualified by the accident of birth; tradition 
objects to their being disqualified by the accident of death.
37
  
 
The modernist tradition of radical republicanism, evident in the willingness of 
the American founders to disregard the existing constitutional shackles of the Articles 
of Confederation, can also be traced to the French revolution.
38
 This latter tradition, in 
particular, rejects the idea that the pre-existing popular sovereignty of the people 
should have been constrained entirely by constitutional representation, thereby 
denying the legitimacy of constitutional rules that would lock in a super-majoritarian 
requirement for the constitution’s own revision.
39
 And Arendt can be prayed in aid 
here because, although alive to the pathology of permanent revolution, she also saw 
its antinomy in a conservative revolution that came to belie its own origins by 
supplanting republicanism with traditionalism.
40
  
A counter to traditionalism in the republican tradition, therefore, is that 
entrenched constitutionalism is akin to ‘rule from the cold graves of dead men of 
constitutions past’,
41
 and hence illegitimate. Jefferson argued against entrenchment, 
stating famously that one generation was to another what one independent nation is to 
another; nations cannot make laws for each other, neither should one generation have 
such a power.
42
 There is today a tradition of Jeffersonian republicanism in America 
that advocates a more active role for the people,
43
 and this is where the argument for 
constitutional referendums gains some leverage. Amar has gone so far as to advocate 
the revival of popular sovereignty through a national referendum as an alternative 
constitutional amendment mechanism to complement the careful balancing of 
institutional roles set out in Article 5 of the US Constitution.
44
 For him it is the people 
at any present time who constitute the republican ideal of ‘the people’, and not an 
abstraction of this concept through the representation offered by a constitution.
45
 This 
radical approach, therefore, envisages a self-governing people at any moment as 
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 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: Fontana, 1961). 
38
 L. Jaume, ‘Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its Consequences’ in M. Loughlin and 
N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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 We see modern manifestations of this in de Gaulle’s preparedness to invoke popular sovereignty in 
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231. 
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(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) 243. 
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 A. R. Amar, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment’ in S. Levinson (ed), Responding 
to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995) 89, 115. 
42
 Thomas Jefferson, letter to John Cartwright, 1824. See also Locke, n 31 above ch 8, s 116. 
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 E.g. C. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); 
B. Ackerman and J. S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
44
 Amar, n 41 above. 
45
 James Wilson was a dissonant voice who expressed the radical promise of the American 
revolutionary experience, since truncated by constitutionalism: ‘in our governments, the supreme, 
absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our 
legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.’ Wilson, cited by J. Elliot, The Debates in 
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Washington: US Congress, 
1901), 2:432.  
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having the capacity legitimately to displace both the super-majoritarian and temporal 
constraints of constitutional entrenchment.
46
  
Another argument, this time from the critical republican tradition, contends 
that constitutionalism can act as a hegemonic force, not only constraining the 
republican, political potential of the people, but in doing so serving to uphold 
powerful vested interests. Law crystallises constitutional rules which are in fact tools 
used by elites to entrench their status.
47
 We find in this movement a charge that 
liberalism as an ideology is well-served by such conservative entrenchment. Indeed, 
Dryzek characterises liberal constitutionalism as an exercise in solidifying an 
‘aggregation of pre-determined interests under the auspices of a neutral set of rules: 
that is, a constitution.’
48
  
The arguments both that the people should not be constrained by decisions of 
a mythical people in the past, and that such constraints are often in fact reactionary 
devices to protect vested interests, lead radical republicans towards the conviction that 
popular sovereignty ought to be kept alive: the people should be able directly to 
challenge those vested interests that can otherwise use constitutionalism to protect 
their privileged positions. This is not in itself an argument for referendums, but it is a 
commitment to direct democracy in the broadest sense of seeking the active 
engagement of citizens in matters of the highest constitutional importance. The people 
as democratic reality rather than as represented, constitutional symbol is the only 
legitimate source of democratic authority.
 
It is a short step to argue for a constitutional 
referendum on the basis that when an issue that goes to the heart of the constitutional 
settlement is implicated, then the people should be directly engaged in the decision-
making process.
49
  
It should be observed that arguments for direct democracy in these situations, 
and even for the use of referendums, can be and most often are, arguments for the 
exceptional resort to such a device as an occasional supplement to the generality of 
representative government. This is one of the reasons why it was important to 
distinguish constitutional law-making from ordinary law-making. The argument 
against direct democracy is often categorical and absolute in its negativity, but 
advocates of constitutional referendums can argue for a mixed system, with direct 
democracy serving to complement representative democracy in extraordinary 
circumstances only. Indeed, as will be observed shortly, referendums in these 
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situations can be argued for precisely because of the exceptional nature of the major 
constitutional change that is at issue.
50
  
A third argument that challenges the norm of entrenchment to the exclusion of 
direct popular involvement in constitutional decision-making is that there might be 
perceived to be a conflict of interest if constitutional institutions have the exclusive 
authority to make decisions which amend their own constitutional prerogatives.
51
 
Furthermore, a fourth argument counters the idea that people have no expertise, time 
or inclination for direct engagement. The exceptional nature of constitutional 
referendums arguably makes it easier to generate popular enthusiasm to participate in 
one-off referendums. This and the fundamental importance of the issue at stake both 
seem relevant factors in generating public interest. As Arato argues: ‘constitutional 
politics due to its extraordinary nature, has the potential to promote the public 
participation of individuals otherwise dedicated to private happiness, and whose 
political involvement is inevitably a shifting one.’
52
 Frey also notes:  
 
As the voters are taken to be badly educated and ill informed, subject to 
manipulation and to emotional decisions it is often argued that referenda 
should be admitted for small and unimportant issues, only. In contrast, issues 
of great consequence - such as changes in the constitution – should be left to 
the professional politicians. The opposite position makes more sense. Major 
issues can be reduced to the essential content. Evaluation then is not a matter 
of (scientific) expertise but of value judgements. Following methodological 
individualism, only the citizens may be the final judges when it comes to 
preferences, and a substitution by representatives is, at best, a second best 
solution. As the politicians have a systematic incentive to deviate from the 
voters' preferences, a substitution leads to biased outcomes.
53
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The turnout in the Quebec referendum in 1995 (93%), and that of 86.5% of Danes in 
the second Maastricht referendum in 1992, lend some support to these arguments, 
though, it must be said, this assumption needs to be tested by political scientists. 
There is also the possibility that civil engagement potentially brought on by a 
referendum will bring a fresh eye to high constitutional politics that politicians lack. A 
related argument is that referendums might in fact be beneficial for such extraordinary 
matters, removing them from ordinary political processes where party interests and 
other established dynamics might frustrate the possibility of a broader and fresher 
debate. It may even be suggested that these processes provide the time and the 
openness of decision-making that is lacking in institutionalised forms of decision-
making. 
To conclude, constitutional entrenchment is an established norm of liberal 
democracy for good reasons, but on the other hand there are strong arguments from 
the radical and critical republican traditions that the people should be directly engaged 
in important constitutional decisions. This is not in itself an argument for 
referendums, but those who are concerned by the conservative and constraining 
potential of constitutional entrenchment seem more open to the merits of referendums 
as an alternative and occasional model of constitutional decision-making. But even if 
a prima facie case is made for constitutional referendums in certain circumstances, we 
must not lose sight of the attendant dangers that direct democracy can bring. This is 
clear as we turn to normative arguments for constitutional referendums that concern 
the issue of identity in constitutional politics. A strong case for referendums might be 
made in this context, but it is also here that we see the significant risk of majority 
hegemony that they entail. We will now address the issue of constitutional identity 
including how referendums are criticised for their homogenising tendencies before 
turning in Section III to the possibility of applying deliberative democracy as a model 
for referendums that might help obviate some of these hegemonic and homogenising 
risks  
  
3. Constitutional referendums and constitutional identity 
The magnitude of constitutional issues can be encapsulated in the two dimensions of 
self-determination. The preceding subsection considered the question of 
‘determination’ (will-formation and expression), and the issues that arise from direct 
involvement of the people as they supplant, or at least complement, the determining 
role of constitutional institutions in higher order law-making. Here we  turn to the 
implications constitutional referendums hold for the ‘self’. Fundamental constitutional 
decisions within a democracy, whether taken through the direct agency of citizens or 
by their representatives, can involve reflection on the nature of the collective demos, 
i.e. the very identity of ‘the people’ as constitutional subject. But it is in the former 
case, direct democracy, that this process is more evident. As Kalyvas puts it: 
‘Constituent politics might be seen as the explicit, lucid self-institution of society, 
whereby the citizens are jointly called to be the authors of their constitutional identity 
and to decide the central rules and higher procedures that will regulate their political 
and social life.’
54
 The very act of staging a constitutional referendum is itself both a 
declaration that a people exists and a definition of that people. In this sub-section we 
will explore how controversial even the act of holding a referendum can be when the 
identity of the people, and/or its territorial limits, are deeply contested. 
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The notion of the demos offers democratic legitimacy to the modern state, 
with any democratic act within the polity implicitly bearing the name of the people. 
But what gives substance to the collective character of this politically-mobilised 
people is rarely subjected to deep deliberation in ordinary political life. In processes 
of representative government the polity typically operates without any grand, 
symbolic mustering of a state-wide personality. Therefore, the referendum can 
intervene in such an environment in an unsettling way, since the direct engagement of 
citizens qua ‘the people’ makes the purported collective identity of the demos much 
more difficult to ignore; and, indeed, a referendum on the very question of 
constitutional sovereignty makes such self-reflection almost inescapable. As we will 
observe, this can be particularly challenging where the idea that the polity contains 
only one, unified demos is challenged. 
It is indeed notable that the idea of the people does tend to lie dormant and 
largely unarticulated not only in democratic practice through the established contours 
of representative democracy, but also, and more surprisingly, in democratic theory. 
Canovan has recently observed: ‘Unlike ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, or even ‘nation’, 
‘people’ has attracted hardly any analysis, even by theorists of democracy’, a fact she 
deems ‘astonishing’.
55
 However, this seems to be changing, particularly as we now 
see so much academic debate concerning the issue of cultural identity
56
 and the 
implications of cultural and national diversity for the maintenance of rights and duties 
within the modern state.
57
 Indeed, within these debates we can identify a tension 
between two normative traditions: one that promotes the value of cultural pluralism, 
and one that stresses the benefits of nation-building republicanism. And here the 
constitutional referendum becomes particularly controversial because it is argued, 
within the former tradition in particular, that, in asking a ‘people’ to speak with one 
voice, a referendum can serve to suppress the deep diversity within the community.  
The pluralist tradition appears to be suspicious of the traditional narrative of 
‘the people’ altogether. The origins of this scepticism are to be found in reactions to 
the revanchist nationalism of the 1930s. Indeed Arendt, herself deeply uncomfortable 
with nationalism, considered that one reason for the neglect of the constituent 
sovereign was its potential for reactionary manifestations through ‘the multitude’.
58
 
Arendt’s suspicions extended to the very idea of sovereignty as a generality
59
 and 
popular sovereignty in particular.
60
 Today the danger of fascism is less of a concern, 
but a related suspicion has been inherited by pluralist politics; namely that the very 
notion of the demos can imply a level of homogenisation that does not reflect the 
kaleidoscopic reality of its composition. Although the demos is traditionally taken as 
a logical prerequisite within democratic theory, the very coherence of the notion of 
one demos, and indeed of the nation-state as locus for it, is increasingly called into 
question in a more cosmopolitan climate. Critics in the post-modern tradition object 
that the idea of ‘the people’ is too holistic to be serviceable today; and this can be a 
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more general point about the purported uniformity of collective identities in a time of 
fragmentation.
61
  
But not all difference democrats are so pessimistic. For example, Young is 
open to the possibility of a shared language of reasonableness provided this leaves 
content open and is non-oppressive. This seems to be a useful starting point which 
permits an epistemology of common reason without setting the terms for the content 
that flows from it.
62
 And, interestingly, Young shares to an extent the republican 
position that, as a matter of logic, some idea of the public is needed. However, for her 
this must be a fluid construction that can develop through deliberation; it should not 
be an aggregative ensemble of pre-fixed wills because an aggregative model ‘lacks 
any distinct idea of a public formed from the interaction of democratic citizens and 
their motivation to reach some decision.’
63
  
This point about the inherent incompatibility of republicanism and a non-
deliberative approach to democracy is well-made. But at the same time, to give up on 
the idea of the people almost seems to be akin to surrendering the idea of democracy. 
The republican tradition holds to the idea of a demos and sees it as a vital point of 
shared identification that consolidates the collective identity of a free people around 
the notion of the polity, with resulting benefits for the shared responsibilities of 
citizenship that attend such a project.
64
 David Miller, for example, has argued that the 
idea of the nation is essential in building the civic resources necessary to establish a 
sense of mutual obligation within a particular, territorially-bounded commonwealth. 
And as a matter of more abstract philosophy there is also a strong argument that a 
sense of ‘we the people’ as a collective is logically a priori to any workable notion of 
either democracy or constitutional form.
65
 Therefore, although it is important to 
achieve ‘inclusiveness without exclusion’,
66
 the notion of a united people taking 
collective decisions is the basis of any democratic system. And so, in this debate 
between sceptics and advocates of the idea of ‘the people’ as a viable resource for 
democratic theory, how can we situate constitutional referendums? In the next section 
we will ask: can referendums be used in the making of fundamental constitutional 
decisions without riding roughshod over the complex differences within society? And 
we will turn to deliberative democracy as a possible way to address this question. 
 
III. IS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFERENDUMS? 
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So far we can say that in the modern civic republican tradition a demos is necessary 
not only so that citizens will assume their share of responsibilities but also to make 
easier the arrival at, and subsequent acquiescence in, political and legal decisions. But 
how can decisions be made in a way that will make diverse groups feel included 
across a diverse polity? In this context the theory of deliberative democracy has 
emerged to complement modern republicanism in order to help supply ‘inclusion 
without exclusiveness’.
67
 This deliberative turn in democratic theory will be 
introduced briefly before we ask whether direct democracy, and in particular 
constitutional referendums, can operate in a deliberative way, thereby helping to 
overcome the dangers of hegemony and homogenisation. 
The notion that unites deliberative democratic theorists across the spectrum 
from radical pluralism to more communitarian republicanism, as we have seen in 
Young’s work, is that decision-making is best made in a deliberative way, namely in 
an open and reflective manner, where participants listen as well as speak, and in doing 
so are amenable to changing their positions. This depends upon a willingness to see 
the other’s point of view and to accommodate it even at the expense of what seems to 
be one’s immediate, rational self-interest. This is characterised as ‘responsiveness’ by 
Gutmann and Thompson.
68
 And as Dryzek puts it: ‘Sometimes participants may, as a 
result of reflection induced by communication, be open to changing their minds; this 
is where deliberation enters the picture.’
69
 This seems to align with republican 
approaches in identifying a necessary condition for over-coming the self-interest that 
is central to aggregative politics. The argument runs that if we are to have a process 
that will transcend the mere aggregation of pre-formed wills then there must be, for 
those taking part, a sense of a community to which one belongs and owes obligations. 
Again, Lindahl argues that the idea of a people must, as a matter of logic, be 
conceptualised prior to deliberation: ‘a simple opposition between representative and 
participative democracy conceals the essential political problem concerning the 
genesis of political community: the preliminary questions (i) who may participate in 
citizen deliberation and decision-making, and (ii) what interests are shared interests, 
worthy of deliberation and decision-making between citizens, are not themselves the 
outcome of deliberation and decision-making between citizens.’
70
  
One division even within this tradition is, however, that between what has 
been called elitist and populist deliberative democracy. Exponents of the former 
believe that decision-making should be deliberative but their focus is upon elites such 
as politicians and judges.
71
 Populist deliberative democrats, in contrast, promote the 
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ideal of decision-making processes that involve ordinary citizens.
72
 Dryzek neatly 
encapsulates the populist position: the ‘essence of democratic legitimacy should be 
sought . . . in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in 
authentic deliberation about that decision.’
73
 In our account of referendums it is the 
latter that is of primary interest.
74
 And in this advocacy of an active populace again 
we see a strong link between the civic republican and populist deliberative democracy 
traditions, for example in scholars such as Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin.
75
 
Finally, we might refer to another commitment that seems to be shared by civic 
republicans and populist deliberative democrats, namely that participation is an 
inherent good. This of course has classical provenance in the work of Aristotle but it 
is also a strong strain of modern republicanism in the so-called ‘civic humanist’ 
tradition.
76
 Together these factors link popular republicanism to popular deliberative 
democratic theory, a link that is a central building block in a republican argument for 
the normative value of constitutional referendums. We can now turn to how the 
constitutional referendum fits within these debates, situating it in the context of both 
republican and pluralist traditions. Having explored arguments that constitutional 
referendums may be an appropriate mode of constitutional decision-making due to the 
interests at stake, not least the identity implications for people in processes of major 
constitutional change, we are still left with the question, can referendums be 
democratic in the republican sense of due deliberation and inclusion?  
We will make three points. The first is that the referendum does indeed 
presuppose a demos in the republican tradition, indeed the identity of the demos has 
been central to a number of significant referendums in recent decades. The second is 
that many pluralist objections are well made in that there is a danger that referendums 
will act as homogenising devices, especially in divided societies. Therefore, the 
demands for inclusion and genuine equality presented by the likes of Young and 
Eisenberg set severe tests which the referendum must meet before it can be included 
in the portmanteau of democratic decision-making, particularly given the evidence 
from political scientists that referendums can act as aggregative models of decision-
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making.
77
 The third point, however, is that, for republicans, the tradition of 
deliberative democracy may provide a way of building constitutional referendums that 
might satisfy both traditions if an acceptable process can be built that is sufficiently 
deliberative and inclusive. 
Taking our first point, it has been observed that one feature of a constitutional 
referendum in particular is that it presupposes a demos. But more than this it seems to 
force participants to confront their shared identity; by calling on ‘the people’ to speak, 
the constitutional referendum implies the very idea that there is a collective that can 
be called ‘the people’. The constitutional referendum presses this issue more than an 
ordinary referendum because it provides a constitutional moment not only of 
decision-making but of self-expression and self-definition.
78
 In requiring a prima 
facie definition of the boundaries of a self-determining people, such a referendum can, 
therefore, be a very useful prism through which to study some of the difficulties in 
theory and practice that surround the identity of the people in the contemporary polity. 
In other words, when a constitutional referendum intervenes in democratic decision-
making, the idea of the people cannot be neglected in practice as Canovan alleges it 
has been in theory. Useful examples of referendums that force this issue include those 
concerning the foundation of a new state. When Slovenians (1990) and Croatians 
(1991) took part in referendums they were required to confront the issue of whether 
they did indeed constitute discrete peoples, ready to call for state recognition on this 
basis. The overwhelming majority in both cases did feel this way, but the Croatian 
referendum also highlights problems; the treatment of Serbs in Croatia demonstrates 
how a reflection on the identity of ‘us’ can also sharpen a sense of ‘them’, the other, 
excluded from the demos. And in a deeply divided society the referendum can bring 
such divisions to a head as it did in Northern Ireland in 1973 and Bosnia in 1992, 
where referendums served to exacerbate ethnic conflict. Another example is 
referendums that offer the further limitation of a people’s sovereign power through 
transference to a supranational entity. People have on occasion shown considerable 
reluctance to commit to such processes as we saw in Denmark in the first referendum 
on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, in France and the Netherlands on the draft 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and in Ireland on the draft Reform Treaty in 2008; in 
each a majority was prepared to resist the aspirations of elites pressing for the transfer 
of further constitutional powers to the EU, in what were arguably active reclamations 
of vernacular popular sovereignty. 
It is, therefore, perhaps no surprise that we see demands for referendums when 
issues of sovereignty arise and the implications for identity may well suggest that, 
from the perspective of republican deliberative democratic theory, there is indeed a 
prima facie argument for the use of referendums in such situations, at least when a 
referendum is favoured by a plurality of people within the polity. But turning to our 
second point there remain deep concerns about the democratic legitimacy of 
referendums, particularly from the perspective of pluralism which identifies the 
potential injustices that can attend their use, especially in divided societies. The main 
objection is that referendums are, of their essence, inherently incompatible with the 
democratic needs of a complex multicultural society. In today’s complex society can 
we really conceive of a demos able to speak as one in a sovereign act? Or does the 
referendum merely empower a majority to make decisions for an oppositional 
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minority? This is a serious question, because if a constitutional referendum is not just 
about will creation and expression but also about defining the identity of a people, 
then the injustice done to a minority might not only be the neglect of their political 
interests but the imposition upon them of a constitutional identity that ill-fits their 
sense of self. It seems that a sxtudy of how the demos is mobilised in recent 
referendums across a range of sovereignty areas might cast light on this. 
Therefore, turning to our third point, republicans who see a sense of collective 
self as essential in sovereignty decision-making must be attentive to the need for 
inclusion.
79
 More than this, the implicit promise of deliberative democracy is not just 
that views are open to change, but that in deliberating on matters of sovereignty, the 
very identity of the demos is fluid not fixed and can in fact be shaped in the moment 
of constitution-building. As Parekh puts it: ‘a general identity of this sort is not a 
property, something we possess, but a relationship, a form of identification that 
citizens create and recreate among themselves over time’.
80
 Here Maiz’s idea of the 
nation as ‘political community’ is instructive as a variation on the civic nationalism 
idea. What is central to this is that deliberation concerns not only the people’s 
constitutional future, but its very identity in ‘an open process of constant 
rearticulation of ideologies, cultures and interests, rather than as an immutable fact’.
81
 
Again this begs the question whether constitutional referendums can be processes 
which facilitate this form of reflection and change. This is a stiff test since for many 
deliberative democratic theorists a process that culminates in voting lends itself to the 
aggregation of pre-formed wills and makes very difficult, if not impossible, genuine 
forms of deliberation.
82
  
Much then seems to depend upon the process of a particular referendum and 
how it meets the tests of inclusion and open deliberation. The standard objection to 
referendums in this context is that they are elite-led, questions are pre-set which 
involve stark Yes/No alternatives, and people only enter the procedure at the end, 
voting in processes that have been carefully tailored to produce a desired outcome. 
But these are aspects of particular referendums, and we have seen in recent years that 
there can be scope for substantial citizen deliberation before a referendum is even 
settled as the mode of decision-making;
83
 for popular deliberation to influence the 
framing of the question;
84
 and for the substantive issue eventually put to the people to 
be the outcome of these deliberations.
85
  
The process of the referendum on the Belfast Agreement is particularly 
interesting given the background of deep division. Here the referendum came at the 
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end of a very complex deliberative process of dispute resolution. What this suggests is 
that a referendum can meet stiff democratic tests if both the substantive issue to be 
tested and the process are agreed to by actors across a deeply divided spectrum. This 
allows the outcome to be seen as legitimate even by those whose position might be 
unsuccessful in the eventual referendum. As Bellamy puts it: ‘The test of a political 
process is not so much that it generates outcomes we agree with as that it produces 
outcomes that all can agree to, on the grounds that they are legitimate.’
86
 One other 
device here is concurrent majorities, whereby it is possible to track if multiple demoi 
in a multinational polity each assent to the issue. There was no such official tracking 
of nationalist and unionist voters in Northern Ireland as there would be in a ‘de Hondt 
referendum’ as it were (i.e. a referendum where a majority within two or more distinct 
groups, as well as an overall majority, would be needed to approve the question), but 
exit polls showed that a majority of nationalists and unionists did in fact vote Yes, 
albeit by a larger majority in the former case.
87
 
So, is it possible that constitutional referendums can be a mechanism through 
which some reconciliation of the republican and pluralist traditions can be achieved, 
making them acceptable decision-making mechanisms for both traditions? Again the 
answer would seem to hinge on whether it can be shown that a particular referendum 
process really does meet the exacting tests for meaningful participation and open-
mindedness set by deliberative standards. There seems in fact to be surprisingly little 
research on whether referendum processes have in fact been capable of overcoming 
the aggregation criticism. But although it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion, 
it seems intuitively plausible that a referendum, carefully tailored to meet the 
specificities of a particular society, can help bring a populace together in a 
deliberative, constitutional moment.
88
 And there is evidence that people are indeed 
capable of reacting in a deliberative and responsive way when considering 
constitutional issues.
89
 We noted earlier how the magnitude of constitutional 
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questions and the identity issues involved can motivate popular interest. Related to 
this, grand constitutional issues are often more easily understood than ordinary 
political questions which can involve complex policy considerations in a particular 
subject area. Given that constitutional referendums are a burgeoning feature of 
contemporary democracy, an important task for constitutional theorists and 
practitioners, therefore, is to assess how referendum processes can build upon this 
popular interest in the most inclusive, educative and genuinely deliberative ways 
possible. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to analyse what is particular to constitutional referendums, 
how they fit within republican theories of sovereignty, and the challenges they pose to 
contemporary normative theories of democracy. It has been argued that they can serve 
to supplant the two levels of representation that are present within democratic 
constitutionalism. The first level, that of will formation and expression, is the typical 
and proper function performed by representative democracy. It was, however, 
observed that when fundamental constitutional issues are at stake, there are prima 
facie arguments from a republican perspective that people should have a direct say, 
and that opposition to referendums based upon the lack of capacity people have to 
engage in politics might be less compelling in these exceptional moments of great 
significance. Another claim we have made is that constitutional decision-making 
involves a second level of representation, namely the representation of the very 
identity of the demos encapsulated in the constitution itself. Again similar, and 
perhaps even more forceful, arguments can be made to the effect that when the very 
existence and manifestation of a constitutional people is at stake, there is a strong 
rationale for direct popular engagement.  
In all of this, however, we have also been mindful of the pluralist critique that 
referendums are, or at least have the potential to be, homogenising, aggregative and 
elite-driven. It has, therefore, been argued that an inclusive model of civic 
republicanism informed by deliberative democratic theory, demands that any 
constitutional referendum, if it is to meet the normative requirements of pluralist 
democracy, must be carefully crafted to ensure that an inclusive and genuinely 
discursive and responsive debate can take place, where even the very content of the 
people’s identity should be open to contestation in the public space. The feasibility of 
such referendums have been hinted at, for example, by that which endorsed the 
Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland. With the rapid spread of the constitutional 
referendum as a mechanism of decision-making, it is imperative that constitutional 
theorists continue to develop the theoretical and practical framework for properly 
deliberative referendums. 
                                                                                                                                            
One notable feature of the deliberative poll is that it is modelled on a situation where decisions 
are reached at the end; in other words they are not merely talking shops. O’Flynn observes that the 
Fishkin research ‘has provided considerable evidence showing not just that deliberation can lead to 
more informed decisions, but that it can also change the way in which people vote. Crucially, the 
deliberative poll does not prescribe consensus but instead assumes that deliberation will end in voting.’ 
O’Flynn, n 76 above, 86-87. He concludes (88): ‘It suggests that there need be no inherent, 
unavoidable tension between the requirement of reciprocity and the act of voting.’ 
